Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1976

Norma E. Green and State of Utah v. Craig E.
Green : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Green v. Green, No. 14610 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/384

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF tl'l'AH
-----------------------------------~-----

<

,i

,~)

r. . . .;

NORMA E. GREEN, and the
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
utah State Department of
social Services,

No.

Plaintiff and Appellant,
)

-vCRAIG E. GREEN,
)

Defendant and Respondent
)

BRIEF OF

Appeal from the ju~~~~
of the Third Judie
County, Honorable_Bryant

_n«·,~~~

Craig E. Green
3872 Rockwood Way
Salt Lake City, Utah
In Pro Per

4;

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------------------,-------------------NORMA E. GREEN, and the
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
utah State Department of
Social Services,

No. 14610

Plaintiff and Appellant,
-v-

CRAIG E. GREEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

~??eal

from the judgment of the District
:::o'..::::t of the Third Judicial District Of
Salt Lake County, Honorable Bryant H. Croft,
presiding.

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Utah Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCill'lENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellants
Craig E. Green
3872 Rockwood Way
Salt Lake City, Utah
In Pro Per
Respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEr-lENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

l

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT

l

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

P~LIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS .

. .

2

ARGUHENT:
Point I:

A FATHER HAS A STATUTORY AND CO~~ON LAW
OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT HIS CHILD AND
~~INTAIN PARENTAL RIGHTS INCIDENT THERETO . • • . . • . . . . • • . . • . . . .

3

UPON THE SIGNING OF THE ADOPTION
AS PRESCRii3'0:D IN THE ADOPTION
u,:\ ARE THE PA&.~TAL RIGHTS TERMINATED

5

TnE PROVISIONS OF THE JUVENILE COURT
ACT FOR THE TER~!INATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS WAS NOT FOLLOWED AND THEREFORE
THE ORDER IS VOID

8

Poi:-::C II:
O~'::_y

.J?.D:::~

Poir.-: III:

9

CONCLUSION .
CASES CITED
Gaidos vs.

Gaidos, 293 P.

2d 388,

Jenkins vs. Jenkins, 107 Utah 261, 153 P. 2d 262
Lopes vs. Lopes,
Price vs.

30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P.

Price, 4 utah 2d, 153, 289 P.

Rees vs. Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264,
Riding vs.

Riding, 8 Utah 2d 136,

Utah Fuel company vs.

8

(Wash., 1956)
(1944).

4

26 687 (1974).

4

2d 1044

7

311 P. 2d 788

(1955)
(1957) ·

329 P. 2d 878 (1958)

4
3, 6

Industrial Commission, 83 Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
4
166, 27 P .. Library
2d 434
.Act,
..
. . . by· the· Utah
.. State
· Library.
· · · ·
Services (1933)
and Technology
administered
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated 55-10-109 (195 3)
Utah Code Annotated 78-30-11 (1953).
Utah Code Annotated 78-30-14 (4)
Utah Code Annotated 78-45-2 (4)

(1953)
(1953) .

Utah Code Annotated 78-45-3 (1953)
R

Record

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Utah State Department of
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Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vCRAIG E.

GREEN,
Defendant and Respondent.
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STATE~1ENT

~;~~::-:~~s

Cause f.:;.:-

2.

OF 7h'E :lATURE OF THE CASE

asked the Court in an Order to Show

j u:'.:;:cent on unpaid child support in the amount of

One thousand, One hundred seventy-seven and 44/100 dollars
($1,177.44) based on the premise that the Order of the Court
entered the 24th day of January, 1974 relieving the respondent
of his support obligation was void and that the obligation of
support was in effect for the entire period of time since the
order, not withstanding the order itself.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
After the lower court ruled against appellants and
then vacated its order on a motion for reconsideration, it ruled
that the order entered in 1974 was valid and should be reinstated.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants request this court to reverse the final
order of the court sustaining the 1974 order and directing
the lower court to make a determination as to the amount of
support owed under appellant's order to show cause and directing
the court to enter judgment in favor of the state for the
amount determined to be owing.
STATENEHT OF FACTS
Co-plaintiff Norma Green and the defendant Craig
Green wer= divorced the 15th day of November 1972 (R-17 ,18).
There w=.s one :-': :'..ld of the marriage, I!ichael Brandon Green.
Purs ua:-:-: -:o t:-.e

::=cree, the de fen dan t was ordered to pay $75.00

per mor:-::.:.-: sup_?;::-: for the chile.
defendan~

was

no~

As the record reflects, the

faithful in meeting his obligations and

judgments were entered against him.

(R. 27, R. 47)

The parties then entered into a stipulation relieving
the defendant of all obligation of support and relieving him
of all parental rights upon the signing of the consent to
adoption.

There is no dispute as to whether the defendant

signed the agreement.

The fact is, however, that the co-plaintiff

has never remarried, and the child has never been adopted, and
that the order was based on the supposition that "II. The
(R. 52)

plaintiff intends to remarry.

As per Exhibit "B" of the State of Utah with its
order to show cause (R.

74)

the child has been on public Assis-

tance since the order referred to above.

The court dismissed ~e
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state's Order to Show Cause on the grounds that the court had
previously relieved the defendant of all parental rights and
duties of sup port. ( R.

82) .

Counsel for the State noticed up a motion for Reconsideration based on the Utah Case of Riding vs. Riding
8 Utah 2d 136, 329 P. 2d 878 (1958)

(R.

84).

That matter came

on for hearing on the 9th of April 1976 at which time the
Court vacated its prior Order and continued the matter in order
to have the co-plaintiff appear to discuss the situation (R. 87).
That mac:::er came on for hearing the 7th day of Hay, 1976 at which
time the Cour'= again reversed itself and reinstated the prior
Orderdec~~d

Fe::Or:.:a:::y 2_3, 1976

(P..

92) which terminated the defen-

_:;s c. :::est.:l t of the Courts see-saw approach in light
of the precedure of Riding, id., the appellants feel compelled
to appeal for the sake of the child and for the support due and
owing until the child turns 21 as ordered by the divorce decree.
(R.l8).
ARGUHENT
--POINT I
A FATHER HAS A STATUTORY AND C0!-1HON LAh' OBLIGATION
TO SUPPORT HIS CHILD AND MAINTAIN PARENTAL RIGHTS
INCIDENT THERETO
The laws of the State of Utah, whether by Statute
or by case point out the great concern of the courts over
parenthood of children.

Utah Code Annotated 78-45-3 states:
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"Every Man shall support his wife and his child."
Child, as defined by that chapter is a "son or daughter under
the age of twenty-one years and a son or daughter of whatever
age who is incapacitated from earning a living without sufficient
means."

(U.C.A.

78-45-2 {4)

This court has also spoken on this subject in Jenkins
vs. Jenkins 107 Utah 261, 153 P.

2d 262

where the court said

a father has a positive duty to support his minor child.

Further,

in Rees vs. Archibald 6 Utah 2d 264,

this

court

311 P. 2d 788

(1957)

e~?hasized:

"'i'his court has invariably emphasized
=~~er's obligation to support his child~en ~~se= upon the elenentary principle that
~e leN inposes upon those who bring children
in':o tl::e ·..;orld the c·.::.'::y to care for and support
':he:n ::ic:ri::.g their minority and dependency."
(Er:-.pha.si3 acded.)
~he

These cases have been the standard which Utah courts have been
required to follow.

It seems only logical, that with such case

law and statutory language, two people, as in this case, cannot
stipulate

away that right to parenthood which the child has.
In fact, this court held in Utah Fuel Company vs.

Industrial Commission 83 Utah 166, 27 P.
child cannot waive its support.
30 Utah 2d 393

2d 434

(1933)

that a

Further, through Lopes vs. Lopes

(1974 ) this court won't even allow

testimony by parents to "bastardize" children because they are
taking away from children a solid right they have.
court won • t

Thus, if this

allow children to be voluntarily bastardized through

· ·
that
the acts of the "parents" and if this court takes the pos1 tlon
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children cannot give up that right, it would be totally
inconsistent for this court to hold, as the lower court did,
that the child is forever severed from his parental affection
and relationship simply because the parents want to so
stipulate presently. Under the lower court order, the child
is fatherless simply because the mother had "intended to get
married' and yet never did.
There are only two possibilities, known to the
appella~-::s

where parental rights may be severed.

Neither

of those -::1vo procedures were followed in this case. The first
is by h::

-~ns

a:-, actual adoption take place.

throug:-_

-'";:o:c:.-:::~ion

The second is

hearings in the juvenile court. Any other

attempt -:::: s-=-, -.:- the rights, as in this case, is VOID under
the la,,- :=.nO. s:-:c .1ld so be decla:::-ed.

Each of the foregoing

situations is discussed in the following arguments.
POINT II
ONLY UPON THE SIGNING OF THE ADOPTION ORDER AS
PRESCRIBED IN THE ADOPTION LAW ARE THE PARENTAL
RIGHTS TERHINATED
The lower court entered the order in this case
that upon signing a "consent to adoption" the parental responsibilities, liabilities, and privileges were terminated
from that time onward.

What makes this matter even more

repulsive is the fact that the order described above was
done by written stipulation based on the premise that the
plaintiff "intends to remarry."

Such is void because no
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adoption has taken place, no marriage has been entered by
plaintiff and the poor child suffers bizzare consequences of
the stipulation as being a "nobody's child".
This issue should easily be put to rest based on
this Court's position in Riding vs. Riding, supra.
the same facts apply with a few minor changes.

Basically

In Riding, id.

the ex-wife remarried and the second husband entered into an
agreement with the first husband to adopt the
t~e

relieve

child and

first husband of his obligations to the minor chiN.

This was later incorporated into a court order so relieving the
first

h~-=:u:d

second

o: his rights and obligations.

~-~ja~~

ex-wife
divorce~

:::..::~-:'.

~:...

Thereafter the

:3iled to instigate adoption proceedings and

t~

first husba!"!c! for child support after she

the second husband.

Ttis court said relative to that

Order:
"If the judgment entered on January 5, 1950,
be construed as a final and unconditional judgment
relieving defendant from any and all further obligation to support Robert Jay Riding then the same
was and is absolutely void.
There is not vested
in any court of this state the right to make a
final order relieving a father, permanently,
of his obligation to support his child except
under the Adoption Statute." (Emphasis added)
Further, the court continued:
" He are of the opinion that the order
signed by Judge Ellett and filed in the divorce
action was a conditional order.
It recites
that it is "based upon stipulation filed herein."
The stipulation contemplated the adoption by
Glen Offret of Robert Jay Riding.
The stipulation recited that Offret consented to adopt
the child and acknowledged "his desire and
willingness to maintain the relationship of
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parent and child and to support and maintain
said minor child and to provide it with all
~hose rights and privileges ordinarily existing
ln such relationship."
However, there was no compliance with the
adoJ?tion statute.
He must interpret the order
a~ 1ntended to go into effect after the adoptlon had been complete, which condition never
occurred." (Emphasis added)
The court then cited Price vs. Price 4 Utah 2d 153, 289 P.2d
1044 (1955)

as follows:

" Future child support effectively cannot
be the subject of bargain and sale.
Among
other things, the State is an interested party
in such natters since a child's welfare is at
stake
~~e

At this.
the

or-__

~

* * *.

11

order relieving parental obligations was voided,

tc S':c-..; Cac:se rei:r..stated, a:1d the matter remanded

to the :::s-:ri.c':: :::curt.
-=:-':is :::c=':: e:nphasizeC. l'tah Code Annotated 78-30-11
Hhich sta-:.es that:

"The natural parents of an adopted child
are, from the time of the adoption relieved of
all parental duties toward and all responsibility
for the child so adopted, and shall have no further
rights over it."
In the instant case, the woman has never remarried,
and may never remarry.

This would leave the child in limbo,

not able to collect benefits from Social Security, inheritance,
etc., not to mention the total cutting off of the parental
relationship.

The fact that the plaintiff " intended to marry"

isn't conclusive, for ever after a remarriage, the new husband
must wait one year before an adoption can take place pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated 78-30-14 (4}.

In any event there is a one
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year period of "bastardization" even if the adoption goes through,
The 1-lashington Supreme Court in Gaidos vs. Gaidos 293
P.

2d 388,

(Wash, 1956)

carne to the same conclusion as this court.

Though the major portion of the opinion was directed in a
different path, the court said:
"The fact that the stepfather is able and
willing to contribute to their support does
not relieve the father of his responsibility,
which continues until such time as they are
adopted, reach majority, or are otherwise
ernailClpated . " (Emphasis Added)
Thus we see that no adoption has taken place in this case.
hasn't even been a remarriage.
mention o:'
contend,

ado?~::.or:

~~at

There

In fact, there has been no

except in the original stipulation.

Appellants

becaase of the facts and the law as here cited,

Judge C:co:::t's r1..:::.i::-:.; sustaining t..he lmver court's prior order
should be reve::-5ed with the prio:c order being set aside as being
VOID from its inception.
POINT III
THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUVENILE COURT ACT FOR
THE TER-MINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS lvAS NOT
FOLLOWED AND THEREFORE THE ORDER IS VOID
The only other provision of the law which appellants
know of to terminate parental rights is found in Utah Code
Ailnotated 55-10-109.

Under this section the legislature has

spelled out the grounds for such determination.
incompetence or unfitness of parents, (b)
of child, {c)

These are (a)

abandonment by parents

refusal to give child proper parental care over a

protective period, (d)

upon voluntary petition of the parent(s)
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if the court finds it in the best interest of the child.
The record is void of any of the foregoing.

There

has never been such an action filed in Juvenile Court.

Even

if there had been an action filed there, the law requires an
in depth analysis of the facts before the court is permitted
to terminate the rights.
This court should take notice that the statutory
procedure was not followed and therefore, no termination of
rights has taken place in accordance to law.
CONCLUSION
_:1·2

our

soc~

parenc~:..

only an

·nc=.:_ :are of children is of utmost importance to
~llow

_
::~c;:·;::;
~~use

o~

stipula~ed

court orders to terminate

..!?On the whio and feelings of parents is not
discresion but also a tragedy in our society.

The plaintiff "intended to marry," whatever that means, but
in fact didn't.

Utah law requires a father to support his

children, stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding.
Therefore, this court should reverse the order of
the lower court and remand this matter for a hearing to
determine the arrearage accrued since the entry of the
stipulation.
Respectfully submitted:
VERNON B. ROHNEY
Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCWIYENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellants
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